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Richard and I debate the merits of regulation
 vs ownership with focus on the grid
There is much to be debated: but I shall 
confine myself to the grid-generator 
competition/coordination game
• Has the function of transporting (large amounts of)
electricity
• Has the characteristics of
– Very large long-lived investments that are sunk
– Uncertainty represented by changes of demand and generation in
total and at locations
– Poorly defined property rights rendering external effects
• In most jurisdictions there is a grid and it is regarded
as a natural monopoly yet it has competition from
– Generation locating next to fuels, next to populations
– Gas pipelines & discoveries
The Grid
• While the grid does not generate electricity it
– Affects costs by affecting energy losses and congestion
– Affects the availability of energy to any location by capacity
provided for transport
– Provides generator options to utilise a range of fuel sources
• The Grid and Generation are both
– Substitutes for each other
– Complements with each other
• There is thus a game about whether to expand the grid, transport
of other fuels, and/or invest in generation at particular locations.
These may all (more or less) be sources of competition at a
location
The Game
• The network effects of the grid-generator game are little
different from the hardware store/supermarket game: it too
has poorly-defined property rights
• The grid game differs in extent with
– lumpiness of investment,
– irreversibility of investment and therefore the uncertainty and risk
borne by generators and the grid
-  specific-asset complementarities between grid and some generation
• There is also the natural monopoly status of the grid.
• It calls for some (ring fenced) centralised
control/cordination
What is so Special About this Game?
• The regulation of a profit seeking, often publicly
owned, firm, by a stand-alone body.
• It includes the regulation of prices and approval of
(major) investment plans
• It is an approach to be found in various guises in the
UK, Australia and many countries in Europe (including
Germany, Spain, Finland), but not (on various
dimensions) in NZ
The Regulatory Answer!
• The grid becomes a leader in the game: one that
anticipates other players’ strategies that in turn
anticipate the grid’s strategies
• It has the effect of changing the game, arguably, to
one of commitment to grid plans that reduces
uncertainty and risk leading to a more coordinated
outcome of the grid-generator game, albeit one where
the grid is the first mover (RMA willing).
• The process may admit competing merchant
investment
The Regulatory Answer (con’t)!
• Stand alone regulatory organisation confined to the
responsibility of grid investment planning/commitment
and pricing.
• It requires profit seeking firms and ideally government
separation from dual roles of owner - regulator
– Provides knowledge of the firm’s objectives
– And potentially rewards good decisions
• Provides oversight that holds the grid to its committed
plans
The Regulatory Institution
The form of regulation ideally
– Should support the investment and maintenance
actuality and plans
– Should enable appropriate risk sharing:
• being the leader affects risk
• the form of regulation determines risk
– Should have incentive for efficiency and appropriate
investment
Regulatory Process and Settings
 Guthrie (2006) Rate of return        Price cap
Form of price restriction All prices fixed Price of a basket
of goods capped
 Frequency of reviews Variable Fixed period
Next hearing held
when either party
requests one
Costs to be recovered Actual costs  Costs incurred 
by hypothetical 
efficient firm
 Cost pass-through often allowed sometimes allowed
Firm Risk low high
Customer Risk High Low (if reg. works)
Regulatory Forms
Optimised (Depreciated) Replacement Cost
(Incentive) Regulation: as applied to date
1.    ODRC revaluations induce stranding and extra  
systematic risk on the firm
2.   ODRC revaluations are wise after the event and do not
mimic the decisions of (competitive) firms
3.  ODRC valuations under-estimate the cost of incremental
investment  and replacement
Implies, particularly with any, economies of scale in
investment that the firm must be allowed
a very high rate of return for
incentive regulation to work
The Quandary
• Incentive regulation is desirable
• it can allow competition where possible
• it provides incentive for efficiency
• But incentive regulation cannot work under ODRC
regulation unless rates of return are significantly bigger
than have been allowed to date: perhaps even bigger than
an unregulated firm would go for
• Rate of return regulation
• shifts (most of) the risk to consumers
• has weak incentives for cost saving
• Does not admit viable competition
Background
• The present ODRC approach will (continue to) materially
inhibit investment as it will be assigned too low rates of
return
• Alternative is to set a price/revenue path that allows
• the firm to be viable looking forward
• investment plans to be implemented
• prices on some historical cost basis but for a period
(and mechanisms) that incentivise efficiency and
performance gains
• No scheme will approximate perfection
The Regulatory Approach
• Preserves the tension of the grid-generator game, albeit
with the grid as leader
• Assists investment
• Enables competition for grid ownership, public ownership
and the efficiencies that attend listing.
• Limits the extent of regulation (unless the regulatory net is
arbitrarily extended) to where the key coordination benefits
lie: in taming the grid generator game
• This might best be termed the European model
Thank you
